We consider Gillette's two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information. For each k ∈ Z+ we introduce a payoff function, called the k-total reward. For k = 0 and 1 these payoffs are known as mean payoff and total reward, respectively. We restrict our attention to the deterministic case, the so called cyclic games. For all k, we prove the existence of a saddle point which can be realized by pure stationary strategies. We also demonstrate that k-total reward games can be embedded into (k +1)-total reward games. In particular, all of these classes contain mean payoff cyclic games.
Introduction
We consider two-person zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and, for each positive integer k we define an effective payoff function, called the k-total reward, generalizing the classical mean payoffs [4] (k = 0), as well as the total rewards [19, 20] (k = 1).
In this paper, we restrict ourselves by two-person zero-sum games with deterministic states, and the solution concept is Nash equilibrium, which is just a saddle point in the considered case. We call the considered family of games k-total reward BW-games, where B and W stand for the two players, Black, the minimizer and White, the maximizer.
We denote by R the set of reals, by Z the set of integers, and by Z+ the set of nonnegative integers. For a subset S ⊆ Z+, let R S denote the set of vectors indexed by the elements of S. In particular, S = S(R) ⊆ R Z + \{0} denotes the set of infinite integral sequences with elements not larger in absolute value than R, and for a ∈ S we write a = (a1, a2, . . .). Furthermore, for n ∈ Z+ \ {0} we define [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and write simply R n instead of R [n] .
To describe BW-games, let us consider a directed graph (digraph) G = (V, E), whose vertices (positions or states) are partitioned into two sets V = B ∪ W , a fixed initial state v0 ∈ V , a real-valued function r : E → Z assigning integer weights to the arcs (moves), and a mapping π : S → R. We call the tuple (G, B, W ) a BW-game form and r its local rewards, while the tuple (G, B, W, r, π) is called a BW-game and π is its effective reward. Two players, Black (the minimizer) and White (the maximizer) control the positions of B and W , respectively. The game is played by starting at time t = 0 in the initial node (or position) s0 = v0. In a general step, in time t, we are at node st ∈ V . The player who controls st chooses an outgoing arc et+1 = (st, v) ∈ E, and the game moves to node st+1 = v. We assume, in fact without any loss of generality, that every vertex in G has an outgoing arc. (Indeed, if not, one can add loops to the corresponding vertices.) We assume that an initial vertex v0 is fixed. However, when we talk about solving a BW-game, we consider (separately) all possible initial vertices.
In the course of this game players generate an infinite sequence of edges p = (e1, e2, . . .) (a play) and the corresponding real sequence r(p) = (r(e1), r(e2), . . .) ∈ S of local rewards. At the end (after infinitely many steps) Black pays White π(r(p)) amount. Naturally, White's aim is to create a play which maximizes this payoff, while Black tries to minimize it. (Let us note that the local reward function r : E → R may have negative values, and π(r(p)) maybe negative too, in which case White has to pay Black.) As usual, a pair of (not necessarily stationary) strategies is a saddle point if neither of the players can improve individually by changing her/his strategy. The corresponding π(r(p)) is the value of the game.
As we shall see later, it will be enough to restrict ourselves, and the players, to their stationary strategies in these games. This means that each player chooses, in advance, a move in every position that he controls and makes this move whenever the play comes to this position. Then, the play is uniquely determined by the one time selection of arcs and by the initial position. Such a play always looks like a "lasso": it consists of an initial path entering a directed cycle, which is then repeated infinitely many times.
Mean payoff (undiscounted) stochastic games, introduced in [4] , are BW-games (see also [16, 15, 3, 8] ) with payoff function π = φ:
Such a game is known to have a saddle point in pure stationary strategies [4, 12] and these strategies can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time [17, 22] . Let us remark that the problem of deciding if the value of a mean payoff BW-game is below (or above) a given threshold belongs to both NP and co-NP ( [8, 11, 22] ). The exact complexity of this problem is however still not known; the best known algorithms are either pseudo-polynomial [17, 22] or randomized subexponential [1, 9, 21] .
Discounted mean payoff stochastic games were in fact introduced earlier in [18] and have payoff function π = φ β :
As a consequence of the classical Hardy-Littlewood Tauberian theorems [10] we have the equality
Discounted games, in general, are easier to solve, due to the fact that a standard value iteration is in fact a converging contraction. Hence, they are widely used in the literature of stochastic games together with the above limit equality. In fact, for mean payoff BW-games it is known [22] that for two sequences a
Total reward, introduced in [19] and considered in more detail in [20] , is defined by
It was shown in [20] that a total reward game is equivalent with a mean payoff game having countably many states. The authors derive from this that every total reward game has a value. Furthermore, ǫ-optimal Markovian strategies can be constructed by solving a discounted mean payoff game on the same graph with the same rewards using a discount factor β close enough to 1. The proof of the latter is analogous to the proof in [13] . It is worth noting that the 1-total reward games with nonnegative local rewards are polynomially solvable [14] . This contrasts the fact that mean payoff games with nonnegative rewards are as hard as general mean payoff games, and that the fastest known algorithms for mean payoff BW-games are either pseudo-polynomial [8, 17, 22] or randomized subexponential [1, 9, 21] .
Main Results
In this paper we extend and generalize the above results. For every k ∈ Z+, we define the k-total effective reward, which coincide with the mean payoff when k = 0 and with the total reward when k = 1.
In general, given a sequence of local rewards a = (a0, a1, a2, . . .) let us associate to it another sequence M (a) = (a0, a0 + a1, a0 + a1 + a2, . . .). Then the k-total payoff is defined as the mean payoff of the sequence M k (a).
First, we show that for every k a k-total reward game, when restricted to stationary strategies, has the same optimal strategy as the discounted mean payoff game on the same directed graph and with the same local rewards, if the discount factor is close enough to 1.
Second, we show that for every k in a k-total reward game, to a fixed stationary strategy of one player, there exists a best response of the other that is pure and stationary. This with the previous claim implies the existence of a saddle point in uniformly optimal stationary strategies in any k-total reward BW-game.
Next, we prove that the k-total reward games can be embedded into the family of (k + 1)-total reward games, for each k ∈ Z+. In particular, mean payoff games can be embedded into k-total reward games for all k ∈ Z+. This containment and the example in [7] prove that for each k ∈ Z+, there is a non-zero sum k-total reward game without Nash equilibria.
Finally, it seems possible (and important) to generalize the above results to general stochastic games with (or even without) perfect information, or in other words, to replace the BW-model considered in this paper by the BWR-model, where R stands for positions of chance. For k = 1, it was shown in [2] that there always exists a saddle point, which can be realized by pure stationary uniformly optimal strategies. The similar question for k > 1 remains open.
Remark 1
The k-total effective payoff looks somewhat similar to the moment M k in the theory of probability. The first two cases k = 0 and k = 1 are easy to interpret and they play a very important role: the first two moments M0 and M1 are the expectation and variance, the 0-and 1-total payoffs are the mean and total effective payoffs, respectively. Yet, the higher moments have some important applications too.
Remark 2 We note that, for k = 1, the existence of optimal stationary strategies in k-total reward games can be derived from the general results in [5] . The authors also left an open question at the end of the paper about payoff functions φ that guarantee positional optima for all BW-games, namely, whether, φ can always be expressed as a non-decreasing function of a fairly mixing mapping of the reward sequence. It is easy however to check that the 2-total reward answers this question in the negative.
Iterated Total Rewards
In this section we introduce a complete hierarchy of payoff functions providing a natural generalization of mean and total payoffs, and their discounted counterparts.
Let us first introduce three operators acting on infinite sequences of reals. The limiting average A : S → R and discounted limiting average A β : S → R operators map an infinite sequence into the set of reals, while the moment M : S → S operator maps it into another infinite sequence.
More precisely, given an infinite sequence a = (a1, a2, . . .) and a real 0 < β ≤ 1 we define
and
For convenience, we also extend the definition of the operator A for finite sequences a to denote the average of the elements of a.
Finally, recall that we define M (a) = b = (b1, b2, . . .) ∈ S by setting bi = i j=1 aj for all i = 1, 2, . . .
For k = 0, 1, . . . , we call M k (a) the kth moment sequence of a, and define M 0 (a) = a. We also introduce the following families of functions φ (k) : S → R and φ
Let us note that φ 0 = φ is the mean payoff function, φ 0 β = φ β is the discounted mean payoff, while φ 1 = ψ is the total reward. Following this terminology, we call φ (k) the k-total reward, and φ (k) β the discounted k-total reward. Thus the above hierarchy of payoff functions provides a natural generalization of mean payoff and total reward. We show first that the M operator changes the discounted total rewards by a factor that depends only on β.
Fact 1 For all a ∈ S and for all 0 < β < 1 we have
Proof Using definition (6) and (7) we can write
Given two sequences, x ∈ Z p and y ∈ Z q , let us denote by a = (x(y)) the infinite sequence obtained by listing first the elements of x and then repeating y cyclically, infinitely many times. Let us call such an a ∈ S a lasso sequence, and let us denote the set of lasso sequences that can arise from a graph on n vertices by
where [−R, R] denotes the set of integers of absolute value not exceeding R. Note that a BW-game with n states in stationary strategies always produces a play p such that the corresponding rewards sequence r(p) belongs to Sn(R), where R is an upper bound on the absolute values of the integral arc rewards. We shall simply write Sn when R is not specified.
To be able to state and prove our main results about iterated total rewards, we need next to analyze the above operations on lasso sequences.
Fact 3 For a = (x(y)) ∈ Sn, we have
Note that there is an example in [2] showing that Fact 4 does not necessarily hold for reward sequences corresponding to non-stationary strategies.
Let us also note that M (x(y)) is not a lasso sequence, in general. However, the above facts, obtained by simple counting arguments, imply the following claim, the second part of which can be obtained from the first part by induction on k:
Furthermore, if x(y) ∈ Sn(R) such that A(x(y)) = A(M (x(y))) = · · · = A(M k−1 (x(y))) = 0, then M k (x(y)) ∈ Sn(n k R).
Recall that by adding a scalar to a vector we mean incrementing all components of the vector by the same scalar value.
The above properties allow us to generalize an inequality between the discounted and undiscounted payoffs shown by [22] for the mean payoff case.
Proof It was shown in [22] that for a lasso sequence (x(y)) ∈ Sn(R) we have
Applying this for an arbitrary lasso sequence x( y) ∈ Sn(n k R) we get
By Corollary 1 we have M k (x(y)) ∈ Sn(n k R), thus applying the above for
, and thus the above implies our claim.
Let us note that we can prove actually a slightly better inequality for k = 1; see Lemma 9 in the appendix. This is because not all sequences in Sn(nR) are of the form M (x(y)) for some x(y) ∈ Sn(R). To prove a similarly stronger inequality for any k we would need to understand better the functional dependence of M k (x(y)) on x(y) under the constraints A(x(y)) = A(M (x(y))) = · · · = A(M k−1 (x(y))) = 0, which might be a harder task. For our purpose the above weaker inequalities are still enough.
Uniform Optimality within Stationary Strategies
Let us consider a BW-game form (G, B, W ) and an integral local reward r : E → Z. As before, we denote by R the largest absolute value of an arc reward and use V = B ∪W for the set of nodes. For a subset F ⊆ E of the arcs of the directed graph G = (V, E) we denote by d + F (v) the out-degree of vertex v ∈ V in the subgraph (V, F ). A subset F ⊆ E of the arcs is a pure stationary strategy of Black (resp., White) if d + F (v) = 1 for all v ∈ B (resp., for all v ∈ W ). Let us denote by SB and SW the sets of stationary strategies of Black and White, respectively.
Given a situation (a pair of stationary strategies), b ∈ SB and w ∈ SW , we have a unique walk e1, e2, . . . , ep, ep+1, . . . , ep+q, ep+1, ep+2, . . . , ep+q, . . . from every initial node v0 ∈ V , which consists of an initial path e1, e2, . . . , ep followed by a cycle ep+1, . . . , ep+q, which we traverse infinitely many times. We denote by x = x(b, w) and y = y(b, w) the corresponding reward sequences x = (r(ej) | j = 1, . . . , p) and y = (r(ep+j) | j = 1, . . . , q), and by c(v0; b, w) the payoff value corresponding to payoff function π: c(v0; b, w) = π(x(y)).
We say that a situation
hold for all b ∈ SB and w ∈ SW . We say that (b * , w * ) is a uniform saddle point if (9) holds for all initial positions v0 ∈ V .
The following result follows essentially from [18] .
Fact 5 A BW-game with the discounted mean payoff function π = φ β has a uniform saddle point for all 0 < β < 1,
We shall show next that the same pair of stationary strategies form a uniform saddle point with respect to the total reward π = ψ, if β is close enough to 1.
Theorem 1 Consider a BW-game (G, B, W, r) as above, and choose a discount factor satisfying 0
Proof We introduce two preorders ≺ β and ≺ k on the set of lasso sequences Sn(R) as follows: for two sequences (x(y)) and x( y)) we say that (x(y)) ≺ β ( x( y)) (resp., (x(y)) ≺ k ( x( y))) if φ β (x(y)) ≤ φ β ( x( y)) (resp., φ (k) (x(y)) ≤ φ (k) ( x( y))). We shall show that the preorder ≺ β induced by φ β on Sn(R) is a refinement of ≺ k induced by φ (k) . For this end let us first prove some partial claim about ≺ β . Introduce S(ℓ, +)= x(y) ∈ Sn(R) | φ (j) (x(y)) = 0 for j = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ − 1, and φ (ℓ) (x(y)) > 0 S(ℓ, −)= x(y) ∈ Sn(R) | φ (j) (x(y)) = 0 for j = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ − 1, and φ (ℓ) (x(y)) < 0 for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, and set
It is immediate to see by these definitions that these sets partition Sn(R). We claim that the following relations hold:
To see this, let us fix an index 0 ≤ ℓ < k, and consider x(y) ∈ S(ℓ, +) and x( y) ∈ S(ℓ + 1, +) (or this could be S * if ℓ = k − 1). Lemma 1 implies that
Since M ℓ (x(y)) ∈ Sn(n ℓ R) (by Corollary 1) is an integer sequence, thus by the definition of the A operator we get
Thus, since we have 2(1 − β)n ℓ+2 R < 1 2n the above implies
On the other hand we can apply Lemma 1 for x( y), too, yielding
Inequalities (11) and (12) together imply that S(ℓ + 1, +) ≺ β S(ℓ, +) (or S * ≺ β S(k − 1, +)). Analogous arguments work for the negative side, too, and hence (10) follows.
Since φ (k) has value +∞ on S(ℓ, +) for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 and value −∞ on the sets S(ℓ, −) for ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 by Corollary 1, the only thing left to prove that ≺ β is a refinement of that of ≺ k is to show that these two preorders do not conflict on the set S * .
To this end let us consider two lasso sequences x(y), x( y) ∈ S * such that φ (k) has different values on these sequences. Since φ (k) (x(y)) = A(M k (x(y))) and for x(y) ∈ S * we have M k (x(y)) ∈ Sn(n k R), we again can conclude that the difference between two nonequal φ (k) values is always at least 1/n 2 , say:
We can apply Lemma 1 for these sequences yielding
Since we have 2(1 − β)n k+2 R < 1 2n 2 , the above three inequalities imply φ β (x(y)) > φ β ( x( y)), proving our claim, and hence completing the proof of the theorem.
Let us remark that the proof of the above theorem in fact provides a more complete picture about these iterated total reward functions than the statement of the theorem alone. Namely, the payoff functions φ (k) , k = 0, 1, . . . form a nested sequence, in the sense that the lasso sequences on which φ (k+1) vanishes form a subset of those where φ (k) vanishes, and φ (k+1) has a finite value only on sequences on which φ (k) vanishes. Furthermore, (10) can be claimed for an arbitrary integer k, providing a complete hierarchy in the limit, and we conjecture that S * in the limit contains only zero sequences. It is also interesting to see that all these payoffs rank lasso sequences in agreement with the discounted payoff, and all of them has "essentially" the same discounted version.
Best Response to Stationary Strategies
In this section, we will use two operators on finite sequences: for a sequence a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) we have S(a) = n i=1 ai and M (a) = (a1, a1 + a2, . . . , S(a)). Note that both M and S are linear operators.
Lemma 2 For sequences a, b ∈ R n and real λ ∈ R we have
Proof By definitions of these operators.
For a sequence I of integers (indices), we denote by aI the sequence of the corresponding a components. E.g., if a = (a1, a2, a3, . . .) and I = (1, 2, 3, 2), then aI = (a1, a2, a3, a2). We denote by [1, n] the sequence of integers from 1 to n. If a and b are two finite sequences, then we denote by [a; b] their concatenation. For a subset I of indices we denote by eI the sequence of 1-s of length |I| indexed by i ∈ I.
We define M 0 (a) = a, and for k > 1 we define M k (a) = M (M k−1 (a)). With these notation, the k-total value of an infinite sequence a of local rewards (corresponding to a play) can be rewritten as
Assume in the sequel that X, Y and Z are subsets of the indices, and a, b, and c are finite sequences of appropriate lengths. 
Proof By Lemmas 2 and 3, and by the equality 
Proof Apply (13a) and (13b) of Lemma 2 and Corollary 3 above together with the equality (15) applied for both eY and eZ, and finally use the binomial identity
Corollary 5
Proof Elementary calculations by Corollaries 2, 4, and by the binomial identity (16) . . Furthermore, let us denote by Rr the first r elements of Y , for 0 ≤ r < |Y |, and by αY = [Y, Y, . . . , Y ] the concatenation of Y α times. Then, for the lasso sequence a = aX (aY ) we have
Let us now apply Corollary 5 with Z = [(β − 1)Y ; R r(T ) ] for an arbitrary positive integer β to get
). (19) Assume first that condition (17a) holds. Then the above equality simplifies to
Summing up the above equalities for β = 1, . . . , α(T ), we get
). (20) Since S(M k (a [X;R r(T ) ] ) and |X| + r(T ) are both bounded independently of T , and since
we get from (18) and (20) that
as claimed in (17b).
Let us assume next that condition (17a) does not hold, and let m be the smallest index such that S(M m (a [X;Y ] )) = 0. Consider equality (19) , and note that the summation on the right hand side can be viewed as a polynomial p(β), which is of degree k − m and in which the sign of the leading term is the same as the sign of S(M m (a [X;Y ] )). Then,
is a polynomial of α(T ) of degree k − m + 1, and the sign of its leading term is the same as the sign of S(M m (a [X;Y ] )). Thus, by summing up (19) for β = 1, . . . , α(T ) we get
Since k − m + 1 > 1 and since S(M k (a [X;R r(T ) ] ) and |X| + r(T ) are both bounded independently of T , we obtain (17c) from (18) and (21) by dividing by T and taking limits.
Given a BW-game Γ, we denote by PB(Γ) and PW (Γ) the sets of (not necessarily pure and/or stationary) strategies of Black and White, respectively. Let us note that SB and SW are proper subsets of PB and PW , respectively. Now we are ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 There is a pure stationary best response to a pure stationary strategy in a k-total reward BW-game, for any k ∈ Z+.
Proof Let us consider a positive integer k, and a k-total reward game Γ = (G, B, W, v0, r, φ (k) ). Assume that Black fixes an arbitrary pure stationary strategy b * ∈ SB = SB(Γ), and we will show that White has a pure stationary best response. Though there is a mild asymmetry due to the definition of the value of the game, the case when White fixes a pure stationary strategy can be handled similarly. Let us note that at this moment we may not (yet) assume that a best response exists, at all. We however know that for every 1 > ǫ > 0 there exists a strategy w * ∈ PW = PW (Γ) of White (not necessarily pure and/or stationary) for which
simply by the definition of sup. Let us also note that we can assume
since otherwise any pure and stationary strategy of White is a best response.
To prove our theorem, let us first use the fact that b * is pure and stationary, delete all the arcs going out from vertices controlled by Black which are not chosen in b * , and denote by G * = (V, E * ) the resulting directed graph.
Let us note that any walk in G * starting from v0 arises as the play corresponding to strategies (b * , w) for some strategy w of White. Furthermore, if w is a pure and stationary strategy then this walk is a lasso, and every lasso sequence starting at v0 corresponds in this way to some pure and stationary strategy of White.
Let us next consider the pair (b * , w * ) satisfying (22) , which defines an infinite walk in the directed graph G * along the vertices W = (v0, v1, . . .). As before, let us denote by et = (vt−1, vt) the edges of this walk, and by at = r(et) the local rewards, for t = 1, 2, . . ., and set F = {e1, e2, . . .} to denote the sequence of arcs in this infinite walk in G * .
Let us denote for integers i < j by [i, j] the set of integers {i, i + 1, . . . , j}, and set J0 = {1, 2, . . .} to denote the set of positive integers. To an increasing subset I = {i1, i2, . . .} ⊆ J0 of the indices, i1 < i2 < · · · , we associate the edge set F (I) = {ei | i ∈ I} and we say that F (I) is a walk in G * if the endpoint of ei s is the beginning of ei s+1 , that is if vi s = vi s+1 −1 for all s = 1, 2, . . .. Note that if s ∈ I, then F (I ∩ [1, s] ) is also a walk in G * .
Let us consider an arbitrary infinite increasing sequence I of integers such that F (I) is a walk in G * and let q = q(I) be the smallest integer q ∈ I such that vertex vq is repeated in the walk F (I ∩ [1, q] ). Let us denote then by p = p(I) the unique index p < q, p ∈ I for which vp = vq. , recursively for s = 1, 2, . . .. Note that by the above observation F (J k ) ⊆ F is a walk in G * , F (Cs) is a cycle, and F (Ls) is a lasso with F (Cs) as its cycle, for every index s = 1, 2, . . ..
Let us finally denote by ws, s = 1, 2, . . . a pure stationary strategy of White for which F (Ls) is the corresponding play when Black chooses b * and White chooses ws. (As we observed above, every lasso sequence in G * , starting from v0 corresponds to such a pure stationary strategy of White.)
Recall that we have the notation at = r(et) for all t ∈ J0, and consider a = aJ 0 = (a1, a2, . . .) the infinite sequence of local rewards of the play (b * , w * ).
Let us first observe that if for some index s and m < k we have S(M ℓ (aP s , aC s )) = 0 for ℓ < m and S(M m (aP s , aC s )) > 0, then by Corollary 6 we have
implying that ws is a pure and stationary best response of White to b * , completing the proof of the claim.
Consequently, for the rest of the proof we can assume that S(M m (aP s , aC s )) ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ m < k and s = 1, 2, . . .
For a positive integer t let us define s(t) as the largest index s for which qs ≤ t, and set Qt = J s(t) ∩ [1, t] . Let us then note that F (Qt) is a simple path in G * .
By repeated applications of Corollary 5 and by the inequalities (23) we can write for any integer T that S(M k (a [1,T ] )) ≤ S(M k (aQ T )) + s(T ) s=1 S(M k (aP s , aC s )).
Since F (QT ) and F (Ps ∪ Cs) for s = 1, . . . , s(T ) are all subgraphs of at most n arcs, there is a polynomial p(n, k), independent of T , such that all quantities on the right hand side are bounded form above by p(n, k)R.
We shall show next that in fact we have equalities in (23). To this end, let us note first that if we have S(M m (aP i , aC i )) = 0 for all m = 0, . . . , k − 1 and i = 1, 2, . . . , ℓ − 1, then for every integer T ≥ q ℓ we can write by Corollaries 5 and 6 that S(M k (a [1,T ] 
. Assume now that s is the smallest index such that S(M m (aP s , aC s )) < 0 for some 0 ≤ m < k. Then for all T > qs we can write, analogously to the above by Corollaries 5 and 6 that
We can view the right hand side here as a polynomial of T = |Z| (of degree at most k). According to (23) and our choice of s, the leading term in this polynomial have a negative coefficient. Thus, for all values of T , large enough, we have
implying that for the strategy w of White corresponding to F ([P1; Z]) we have φ (k) (b * , w) > φ (k) (b * , w * ), contradicting the choice of w * . This contradiction proves that we must have equalities in (23) for all s = 1, 2, . . . and m = 0, . . . , k − 1.
The above then implies that for all T we have the equality
Since there are only a finite number of different pure stationary strategies of White, let us choose w * * such that φ (k) (b * , w * * ) is the maximum among all pure stationary strategies of White. In particular, we have φ (k) (aP i (aC i )) ≤ φ (k) (b * , w * * ) for all i = 1, . . . , s(T ).
Then, since |QT | ≤ n and hence s(T ) i=1 |Ci| ≥ T − n, from the above equality we get
Since this inequality holds for every choice of ǫ > 0, it follows that w * * is a pure stationary best response to b * , completing the proof of the theorem.
Remark 3 Let us observe that the above proof goes through even if each player has a (possibly different) payoff function which is a convex combination of lim inf and lim sup.
Hierarchy of k-Total Rewards
In what follows we shall show that the k-total reward is a special case of the (k + 1)-total reward. In particular, mean payoff games are a special case of 1-total reward games, and in general of k-total reward games.
To state and prove our results we need to obtain a functional relation between M (x(y)) and the vectors x and y. To start our analysis, let us consider the all-one vector e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n , and compute its iterated M images and the corresponding sums.
Lemma 4 For e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ R n and for every k ∈ Z+ we have
and correspondingly
Proof The above expressions are clearly correct for k = 0. We can prove them by induction on k using the binomial identity 
Proof For k = 0, the above formula with an extended definition of the binomial coefficients [6] shows that M 0 is the identity operator as assumed. For k = 1 the above expressions coincide with the definitions of the M and S operators. Thus, by induction on k we can write
where the second equality follows by (27) , and the last one by (26). Finally (28) follows by (27) and (26).
Let us recall a few combinatorial identities from [6] , which we shall need in the sequel.
Now we are ready to provide an algebraic description of the M operator over the set of lasso sequences.
Theorem 3 Let us consider integers p, q > 0, k ≥ 0 and a lasso sequence x(y) ∈ Sn(R) with x ∈ Z p and y ∈ Z q , satisfying
Then, we have
where e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ Z q , and
Proof Let us note first that for k = 0 the condition (29) is empty, and the summation in (30) is an empty sum, yielding M 0 (x(y)) = x(y). Furthermore, for k = 1 we have by Corollary 1 that M (x(y)) = M (x) (S(x)e + M (y)), in agreement with (30), since condition (29) is equivalent with saying S(y) = 0 by definition (8) . Thus, (30) follows by induction on k using the linearity of M as in Lemma 2. Finally, (31) follows from (30) after applying the S operator to both sides of (30) yielding the second line of (31). Then, by using the linearity of S by Lemma 2 and applying Lemmas 4 and 5 we get
Finally, applying Lemma 7 with u = ℓ, N = k, X = q − 1 and Y = p − j and subtracting the u = 0 term from both sides we get the last line of (31).
Remark 4 Formula (31) shows that the value φ (k) (x(y)) is a linear combination of the components of x and y. Furthermore, it can be verified that these linear combinations for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, are linearly independent. Consequently, if φ n takes a finite value on a lasso sequence, then all local rewards on this sequence must be equal to 0. On the other hand, there are BW-games such that the φ (n−1) value, from a certain starting position, is finite and different from zero.
For the main claim of this section, we introduce a split operation on sequences: to a given sequence x = (x1, x2, . . .), we associate x (1) = (x1, −x1, x2, −x2, . . .).
We need an additional technical lemma.
Lemma 8 For every integer k there exist reals αj , j = 0, 1, . . . , k such that 2X + k + 1 k = k j=0 αj X + j j holds for all integers X. In particular, we have α k = 2 k .
Proof Let us note that gj(X) = X+j j is a polynomial of X of degree exactly j, for all j = 0, . . . , k. Thus, the polynomials gj, j = 0, . . . , k form a basis for polynomials in X of degree at most k. Hence, every polynomial in X of degree k can be expressed as a linear combination of the gj, j = 0, . . . , k functions, proving the existence of the αj , j = 0, . . . , k coefficients.To see that α k = 2 k , we need to compare the coefficients of X k on both sides.
Remark 5 One can also obtain the explicit values of the coefficients αj in Lemma 8; for completeness, we give these in Lemma 10 in the appendix.
The main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 4 For a nonnegative integer k and any lasso sequence x(y) we have
Proof We prove this claim by induction on k. For k = 0, let us note that M (x1, −x1, x2, −x2, . . .) = (x1, 0, x2, 0, . . .) implying that φ 1 (x (1) ) =
Let us next assume that we have the equalities
for all 0 ≤ ℓ < k. Thus, in particular, the signs of φ (ℓ+1) x (1) y (1) and φ (ℓ) (x(y)) are the same for all ℓ < k. Therefore, by Fact 4 and the definition of φ (k) , both sides of (32) are simultaneously equal to ±∞,
Hence it is enough to prove the claim for lasso sequences satisfying φ (ℓ+1) x (1) y (1) = φ (ℓ) (x(y)) = 0 for all ℓ = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1.
(33) Under these conditions Theorem 3 can be applied and we get for the split sequence x (1) y (1) that 2qφ (k+1) x (1) y (1) is equal to
Let us also note that under conditions (33) we can apply Theorem 3 to φ (ℓ) (x(y)) and express it as in (31) for all ℓ < k. Let us finally note that using these expressions and using Lemma 8 three times, with X = q+p−j, X = p − j and X = q − i we get
αjφ (j) (x(y)).
By condition (33) this further simplifies to
from which the statement follows.
Corollary 7 k-total reward BW-games are special cases of (k + 1)-total reward BW-games.
Proof Let us consider an arbitrary BW-game Γ = (G, B, W, r) and let us define its split, denoted by Γ = ( G, B, W , r), as the game obtained from Γ by subdividing each arc of local reward r(u, v) by a vertex w = wuv and defining r(u, w) = r(u, v) and r(w, v) = −r(u, v). Clearly, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the strategies in Γ and Γ. Then, it is also clear that the expected reward sequence arising from a play in Γ is the split sequence of the reward sequence arising from the corresponding play in Γ. Theorem 4 implies that the games (G, B, W, r, φ (k) ) and ( G, B, W , r, φ (k+1) ) are equivalent; more precisely, the effective values of the corresponding plays are equal up to a multiplicative factor of 2 k−1 .
Remark 6 Due to an example of a non-zero sum mean payoff BW-game [7] that does not have a Nash equilibrium, we can conclude that, for any k ∈ Z+, there are non-zero sum k-total reward games that have no Nash equilibria either. Let us note that the above reduction creates games in which every cycle has zero total length. In fact, we have no NE-free examples with 1-total effective payoff and without directed cycles of zero total length.
It is also interesting to notice that in [20] the 1-total reward was viewed as a refinement of the 0-total one. The above result shows that in fact every 0-total game can be viewed as a special 1-total game. Yet, a polynomial reduction in the other direction is not known.
Since A(y) = 0 is assumed, we have 1 − β p−1 1−βj=1 yj = 0 and thus we can rewrite the right hand side as
Here we have (1 + β + · · · + β i−2 ) ≤ i − 1 and
from which, together with |xi| ≤ R, i = 1, . . . , p and |yj | ≤ R, j = 1, . . . , q, one can derive
implying the claim of the lemma.
B Explicit coefficients in Lemma 8
Lemma 10 Let A, k ≥ 0 be integers. Then . We apply induction on A ≥ 0. For A = 0, we have g(0, k) = k + 1 by (2.4) in [6] , and hence (34) holds in this case. We assume now that it holds for A, and verify it for A + 1.
First we can show the following claim. 
The claim follows by iterative application of (36).
By induction, we have g(A, k − 2j) = 2A+k−2j+1 k−2j
. Thus, it remains to prove the following claim. 
